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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal of a final order from the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, State of 
Utah, modifying the Decree of Divorce previously entered in th 
action. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
§78-2(a)-3(g), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
As a result of a trial held January 19, and 21, 1988, 
before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, Seventh District Court 
Judge, Neal F. Bake, Appellant, has requested this Court to 
review the following issues: 
1. The trial court failed to make any threshold deter-
mination of substantial change in circumstances since entry of 
the Decree of Divorce on the issue of custody, before modifying 
that decree which is a misapplication of the law. 
2. The order modifying the parties' Decree of Divorce 
which changed custody of the parties' two minor children from 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeals No. 880185-CA 
Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
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Neal F. Bake to Vickey L. Bake, was an abuse of discretion by the 
trial judge. 
3. The evidence offered at trial regarding custody does 
not support the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order that it is in the best interests of the children 
that custody be changed from Neal Bake to Vickey Bake. 
4. The trial judge failed to properly apply the law to 
the facts in determining the best interests of the children in 
modifying the custody award herein. 
5. The trial court improperly limited the presentation 
of Defendant's case by proceeding to trial without allowing the 
custody evaluation which had been ordered to be performed; by 
interviewing the children in chambers without making a record of 
that interview and making findings thereon; and by prohibiting 
any testimony at trial concerning Vickey Bake's caretaking of the 
parties1 nephew Steven Springer. 
6. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings on 
which to base its Order modifying custody from Neal Bake to 
Vickey Bake. 
7. The trial court's award of child support to Vickey 
Bake was an abuse of discretion on the facts as presented. 
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
The following statutes require interpretation: 
1. Section 30-35-5, Utah Code Annotated (1984, as 
amended), copy attached. 
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2. Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated (1984, 
amended), copy attached. 
3. Section 78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated (1984, as 
amended), copy attached. 
STATEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties herein were divorced by order of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court for Duchesne County, State of Utah, on 
August 19, 1985, by order of the Honorable Richard C. Davidson. 
The Decree of Divorce awarded the Appellant Neal F. Bake custody 
of the parties1 two minor children, Kyle Bake and Nathan Bake, 
who were ages 10 and 8 at the time of the divorce. (Decree of 
Divorce, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the 
Stipulation are attached hereto as Exhibit A ) . 
The Decree of Divorce did not address the custody of the 
parties1 foster child and nephew, Steven Springer, age 12 at the 
time of the divorce, who resided with Vickey Bake after the 
divorce. Because the Respondent denied Neal Bake access and 
visitation with his nephew Steven, and took the child out-of-
state for an extended period without informing him, he filed a 
Verified Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree in 
January 1987, seeking custody of Steven Springer. (Record, 
58-62, hereafter "R.58-62"). The Respondent filed a 
Counterpetition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce 
requesting custody of the parties1 two minor children. 
On May 18, 1987, a hearing was held before Domestic 
Relations Commission Howard Maetani on the petition of Neal F. 
-6-
Bake for custody of Steven Springer. The Commissioner 
acknowledged that joint guardianship of the boy had been pre-
viously granted by the Juvenile Court, and granted visitation to 
Appellant Neal Bake and ordered that Vickey Bake would continue 
to have physical custody of the child. The Court further ordered 
the parties to have a home study done by an independant child 
custody evaluator to determine what would be in the best 
interests of the parties' two natural children as regards a 
change of custody. (Ex. B hereto, Recommendation and Order 
5-18-87.) 
On November 5, 1987, attorney for Respondent requested 
a hearing on the Counterpetition for Modification concerning the 
parties1 two natural children. No custody evaluation had been 
performed. Counsel for Neal Bake filed an objection to 
Plaintiff's request for hearing on or about January 13, 1988, 
which was denied by the Court. (R.115-118) A trial was held 
January 19, and 21, 1988, on the Counterpetition for Modification 
of the Decree of Divorce concerning custody of the parties' two 
natural children. 
On January 26, 1988, Judge Dennis L. Draney issued a 
ruling changing custody of the two minor children from Neal Bake 
to Respondent. (Ruling attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order modifying the 
Decree of Divorce were signed by the Court on February 18, 1988. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Modification 
are attached hereto as Exhibit D.) 
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On February 8, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion to have 
the Court Reopen Judgment and Direct Entry of a New Judgment and 
for a Stay of Proceedings to enforce judgment. (R. 126-129, copy 
attached as Exhibit E.) This Motion was denied without hearing by 
Judge Draney on February 26, 1988. (R. 147). 
The minor children Nathan and Kyle Bake were in the care 
and custody of Neal Bake from early summer of 1985 until the 
Court ordered a change of custody at the end of February, 1988. 
At the time of the modification trial the children were ages 11 
and 13. 
Judge Dennis L. Draney ordered a custody modification 
based on the following Findings of Fact: 
3. The Plaintiff lives in a doublewide mobile home with 
her husband, his daughter Rachel, age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew, 
Steven, age 14. The home is located in the business district of 
Roosevelt, Utah, on the same lot, somewhat removed from a 
building containing a cafe and a lounge. The home is adequate in 
size and upkeep for it's present occupants and for the boys which 
are the subject of this action. 
4. The Defendant lives in Sandy, Utah, with his parents 
in a residential area of the City. The home is adequate in size 
and upkeep for its present occupants including the boys. 
5. Plaintiff is employed as a waitress at the lounge 
near her home, and works from 8:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.. While she 
is working, Steven cares for Rachel, and there was no evidence 
that the arrangement has not worked satisfactorily. Plaintiff 
would be with the boys virtually every day. 
6. Defendant works as a long haul truck driver, and is 
away from home the majority of the time. While he is away his 
mother cares for the boys. 
7. Both of the parties have a deep concern for the boys, 
and have the ability to care for their needs. 
8. The boys have expressed a strong desire to live with 
the Plaintiff, stating that they want to be with her and with 
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their cousin Steven, and that they enjoy school more in 
Roosevelt, and that their friends are in Roosevelt. 
9. A very favorable picture of Defendant's home and care 
for the boys is presented by the testimony of the Defendant and 
his mother. However, the validity of their testimony is adversely 
affected by significant discrepancy in the evidence presented by 
them. 
10. It was the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff 
that the Defendant recently said to her f,You better get your 
boys back." (R. pp. 148-150). 
On the issue of child support the Court found that 
Vickey Bake earned $1,217.00 per month, and supported her nephew 
Steven. The Court found that Neal Bake earned $1,109.24 per 
month. (R. p. 148-150). On these facts the Court ordered Mr. 
Bake to pay child support in the sum of $115.00 per month, per 
child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Overview. 
After thirteen years of marriage the parties to this 
action were divorced on August 19, 1985. The Appellant Neal F. 
Bake was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children, Kyle 
Kirk Bake (born, 12-17-86) and Nathan Frank Bake (born 10-10-74). 
Plaintiff Vickey Bake was awarded liberal visitation including 
every weekend, the entire summer and alternating holidays. The 
Decree provided that "based on the parties' income and their 
agreement Plaintiff should have no obligation to pay child sup-
port" and both parties waived any claim to alimony, (R. 43-45; 
Exh. A.) 
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Neal F. Bake was awarded the care, custody and control 
of the minor children with the provision that important decisions 
concerning the children, such as medical and schooling, would be 
discussed between the parties. (Exhibit A, Decree of Divorce, 
para. 2). In its findings, the Court found that Mr. Bake was a 
fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the minor children and that the children had expressed a 
desire to live with him. No findings were made concerning Mrs. 
Bake. The Court also found: 
"The parties have agreed that since the award of custody 
is based on the desires of the children that in the 
event the boys change their mind and express their 
desire to return to live with their mother that custody 
would be changed awarding custody to the Plaintiff 
without a need to show a change of circumstances". 
(Exhibit A, Findings of Fact, para. 4.) 
B. Facts Relating to Respondent Vickey Bake. 
After her separation from Neal Bake in March, 1985, 
Respondent moved in with another man, Duane Adderly, whom she 
married ten days after her divorce was final in August. 
(Transcript, hereinafter Htr.'f, 11.) The Adderlys now live in a 
doublewide trailer in Roosevelt, Utah, located about 100 feet 
behind the lounge where they are both employed, (tr. 11-13.) 
Immediately after her divorce in August, 1985, the Respondent 
lived in a camping trailer with Mr. Adderly for about a month, 
(tr. 32.) After that, Respondent and Mr. Adderly moved into his 
grandfather's mobile home in Cedarview where they lived for about 
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one year, (tr. 31.) In July of 1986, the Respondent and Mr. 
Adderly moved to Colorado where they stayed about four months, 
(tr. 26.) After that, the Respondent and Mr. Adderly rented a 
home in Roosevelt where they lived for approximately six months, 
(tr. 29-30). Since July, 1987, the Adderlys have lived in their 
present trailer. (tr. 29.) 
During these five moves in a span of two years, the 
Adderlys household consisted of Mr. Adderly1s daughter, Rachel, 
age 5, and Steven Springer, the nephew of these parties, who was 
age 14. (tr. 11.) 
Vickey Bake works as a waitress and occasional bartender 
at the "Id Lounge" in Roosevelt, Utah. (tr. 12.) Her husband is 
the manager and bartender at the same bar which is located about 
100 feet from the Respondent's trailer, (tr. 13.) The 
Respondent's hours are from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. Tuesday 
through Saturday and she has also worked since the divorce at a 
music store and at Pizza Hut. (tr. 13, 25-26.) The Respondent's 
husband, Duane Adderly, works from 4:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. at 
the "Id Lounge". (tr. 33.) 
Respondent testified that there have been fights both 
inside and outside of the bar which have required police inter-
vention, (tr. 24, 25.) 
Respondent testified that it was Steven, age 14, who 
tended the Adderly's daughter, Rachel, age 5, while the Adderlys 
were at work. (tr. 13.) 
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Respondent testified that she earned $1,217.00 per month 
which includes a monthly stipend of $217.00 from the State of 
Utah for the support of her nephew Steven. (R. 86-88) The 
Respondent also receives food stamps, (tr. 29.) 
During visitation the Respondent has had the children 
working washing dishes in the restaurant, now closed, which was 
part of the "Id Lounge", (tr. 18.) 
The Respondent testified that the doublewide trailer had 
three bedrooms, one for Steven Springer, one for herself and Mr. 
Adderly, and one for their daughter Rachel and that if the 
children came to reside with her they would share Steven's room, 
(tr. 32.) Respondent testified that it was her practice to rise 
in the morning about 9:00 or 10:00 and that Steven typically made 
his own breakfast and went to school on his own without super-
vision, (tr. 33, 34.) 
Respondent testified that her husband Mr. Adderly drank 
beer on a daily basis and had undergone court ordered alcoho-
lism treatment, (tr. 37, 38.) She further testified that he regu-
larly drank whiskey while he was working, (tr. 37, 38.) 
During visitation with the Respondent, Kyle had an 
asthma attack and was hospitalized in Roosevelt. When he was 
returned to Mr. Bake's custody the Respondent did not inform him 
of this episode which he only learned of by accident, (tr. 106.) 
Vickey Bake was aware the boys were in counseling and 
objected to it, but never contacted the therapist, never 
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discussed it with Mr. Bake, and denies the boys had any adjust-
ment problems, (tr. 43, 44.) 
When Kyle was hospitaLized for asthma during visitation, 
Vickey Bake did not inform Mr. Bake when returning the child con-
cerning the incident or any follow-up care. (tr. 106.) 
C. Facts Relating to Vickey Bake's Care of Steven Springer. 
During most of the parties' marriage, they were the 
joint guardians of a nephew, Steven Springer, (tr. 11.) At the 
time of the parties' divorce, the Court did not consider the 
custody issue of Steven Springer and no order was made in his 
regard. Steven had lived with the family since he was age 5 and 
Neal Bake had acted as a parent towards him. (tr. 11, 23.) After 
the divorce, Mr. Bake was prevented from seeing Steven or having 
access to him. Additionally, the Respondent would not keep Mr. 
Bake informed of her whereabouts, she often did not have a phone 
and would not facilitate visitation or contact between Steven and 
Mr. Bake. (tr. 98, 99). When he did have contact with his nephew, 
Mr. Bake had concerns that his needs were not being met as he was 
being required to babysit continually for Rachel, he was not pro-
perly dressed, and he was not doing well in school. (tr. 98, 
100; Verified Petition for Modification, R. 58-62.) These 
problems resulted in Appellant filing a petition for Modification 
of the Divorce Decree wherein he sought custody of his nephew 
Steven Springer. (R. 58-62.) 
Since the parties' divorce, Respondent was the sole 
caretaker of her nephew Steven Springer and she received a 
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monthly stipend from the State of Utah for his care. (tr. 27.) 
While Vickey Bake was the sole caretaker for Steven Springer 
there were four referrals for child neglect and her fitness made 
to the Division of Social Services in Roosevelt, Utah. (tr. 72.) 
Mr. Ralph Draper, the Supervisor of Social Services in Roosevelt 
was responsible for investigating these referrals which were made 
by different parties, (tr. 67, 68.) The first referral was in 
January, 1986, where the complaining party indicated Steven was 
not properly clothed for school, had no lunch or lunch money, and 
was poorly groomed. Mr. Draper confirmed these facts which were 
verified by the Vice-Principal of Steven's school, Mr. Mitchell, 
(tr. 68.) Another referral stated that Steven Springer was always 
tired because he was constantly babysitting, (tr. 70.) Mr. Draper 
testified that he contacted Mrs. Adderly concerning these 
referrals and did not believe they required removal of the child 
from the home. (tr. 71.) Additionally, there were referrals con-
cerning Mrs. Adderly1s lifestyle, that she was living with a man 
she was not married to, that the family was being supported by 
Steven Springer's stipend check, and living in adequate housing, 
(tr. 74.) During a follow-up visit, Mrs. Adderly admitted she 
had some difficulty with Steven. Mr. Draper also interviewed 
Steven himself and testified that he found him to be introverted, 
shy, and unassertive, and "felt that he needed supervision", 
(tr. 81, 82.) 
The trial court refused to allow Appellant to examine 
witnesses on the subject of Vickey Bake's care of Steven Springer 
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although counsel argued that her care of Steven was the best and 
only evidence of her parenting ability since no custody eva-
luation had ever been done. (tr. 100). 
D. Facts Relating to Vickey Bake's Visitation. 
Concerning visitation, Mrs. Cora Bake, Appellant's 
mother, testified that she kept an independent record of every 
call, letter, and visit from Vickey Bake to the boys. (tr. 
123-125.) She testified that this log was kept in a yearly calen-
dar book and was maintained ever since the boys came to live in 
her home. (tr. 123.) In testifying about the contacts between 
Vickey Bake and her sons, Mrs. Bake reviewed the calendar of 
1987, specifically the months of January through May. (Trial 
Exh. 5.) Mrs. Bake testified that in the month of January, 1987, 
there was only one letter from Mrs. Bake. In February, 1987, 
there were two phone calls. In March, 1987, there was one call to 
arrange a visit which occurred on the 13th. In April there were 
no contacts, that is, no calls, letters or visits. In May, 1987, 
there was a call and a visit of a few hours on the 20th and a 
visit on the 22nd. (tr. 125-127.) 
The visit on May 22nd was quite upsetting to Mrs. Bake 
as Vickey Bake arrived one hour early then had been arranged and 
simply walked in the house, took the children and was leaving in 
her car before Mrs. Bake happened to see them by glancing out-
side. Mrs. Bake testified that if she had not happened to see 
them leaving she would have never known they had left the house. 
(Tr. 127, 128.) 
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Mrs. Bake summarized the contacts in her log during 
several months in 1986 as follows. In January one letter was 
received from Vickey Bake to the boys; in April there were no 
contacts, in September there were no contacts, in November there 
was one card received, and in December there was a birthday card 
and one letter, (tr. 129-131.) Mrs. Bake testified that she never 
denied visitation when it was requested by the Respondent and 
that the parties had even agreed to a specific time for telephone 
calls so the children would be home if the Respondent happened to 
call. (tr. 132.) Lastly, Mrs. Bake testified that the children 
never asked to call Vickey Bake nor did they express the desire 
to live with her. (tr. 133.) 
Mr. Bake testified that Vickey Bake would make visita-
tion arrangements and then not show up which upset the boys (tr. 
105) and that there were long lapses between contacts, (tr. 109.) 
Also, that contact with Vickey was difficult because she often 
had no phone and would not keep him informed of her whereabouts, 
(tr. 98, 99.) 
Mr. Bake testified he has had to call the police when 
the Plaintiff refused to return the children after visitation, 
(tr. 109) and that the Respondent was seldom timely for arranged 
visitation, that she was often early, late or would not show up 
at all. There were even times when she refused to return the 
children which resulted in them missing school, (tr. 109, 110.) 
Mr. Bake testified that Respondent would miss special occasions 
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with the children, such as Christmas, 1986, and birthdays where 
there would be no call, letter or contact, (tr. 11.) 
Vickey Bake alluded to visitation problems with the 
Appellant but never sought legal help and could not remember when 
she had called the police except that it occurred "every time" she 
went to the Appellant's house, (tr. 40, 41.) However Respondent 
did not have police with her when she went to the Appellant's 
home May 22, 1987 (tr. 127.) No police reports were introduced by 
Respondents. 
Vickey Bake's father, Bud Nelson testified at the trial 
and stated that until seeing her at trial he had not seen his 
daughter for four years, (tr. 139-140.) Although he sent regular 
birthday and Christmas cards to his daughter Vickey and his 
grandson Steven Springer, he never had any response, (tr. 141.) 
Mr. Nelson testified that Vickey Bake never brought her sons or 
Steven Springer to visit him even though he was not aware of any 
difficulties in their relationship and that she always knew where 
he was. (tr. 140, 141.) 
In contrast, Mr. Nelson testified that Neal Bake tried 
hard to stay in touch with him and would bring his grandsons 
Nathan and Kyle as well as Steven Springer, to visit him since 
the parties had been divorced, (tr. 141.) Mr. Nelson also 
testified that he has had extended visits with his grandsons and 
that in his opinion the relationship between Neal and his grand-
sons was good and that they appeared cared for and happy when 
they were with him. (tr. 142, 143.) 
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E. Facts Relating to Neal Bake, Appellant. 
Mr. Bake testified that he was a truck driver employed 
by Uintah Freightways and earned $1,109.00 per month, (tr. 87, 
89., R. 90-93) He stated that he had worked for his present 
employer three or four months and before that worked for PST 
Vans. He changed companies so that he could be home more with 
his sons even though it meant a cut in pay. (tr. 88.) His present 
job allowed him to be home on weekends and holidays. He also 
testified that he had been looking for other work which would be 
local driving so he could be home on a daily basis, (tr. 88.) 
Ever since his separation from the Respondent on about 
March 11, 1985, Mr. Bake has resided with his parents at their 
home in Sandy, (tr. 89, 90.) There are five bedrooms in the home, 
with two bedrooms downstairs and a play room where the boys stay, 
a large yard and that, the home is located next to Nathan's 
school. (tr. 90.) 
When asked how the original stipulated custody arrange-
ment came about, Mr. Bake testified that Mrs. Bake said she "had 
raised kids all of her life, [that she did not want to raise 
anymore and,] wanted to start a life of her own", (tr. 96.) 
Mr. Bake testified that he spent all of his time off 
with his children and that they were seldom apart, (tr. 97.) He 
often took them on his driving trips, to visit his friends and 
also stated that he actively participated in their school func-
tions and Boy Scouts, (tr. 97, 98.) He testified that the boys 
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were involved in music and choir lessons and that Kyle received 
excellent grades in school, (tr. 97, 102.) Mr. Bake testified 
that his son Nathan had about a C average in school and that he 
personally met with his teachers and implemented a structured 
study time to help improve his grades, (tr. 102# 103.) Mr. Bake 
further testified that he had concerns about his son's adjustment 
to the divorce and thus took his sons to counseling and par-
ticipated with them in family counseling, (tr. 101.) 
Mr. Bake stated that his sons' health was quite good 
although Kyle used to suffered from asthma. However, he testified 
that since the divorce his son was much better and no longer 
needed daily medication for this condition, (tr. 105.) Mr. Bake 
noted that Kyle's asthma attacks apparently reasserted themselves 
when he was visiting his mother. Since the divorce only a single 
episode of asthma arose while Kyle was in Neal's care, and that 
occurred because his mother had told him that she would pick them 
up for visitation and never showed up. The stress from this epi-
sode resulted in a slight attack of asthma, (tr. 105.) 
Mr. Bake has noticed that when the children return from 
visitation they are much harder to handle and are undisciplined 
(tr. 103, 104). He testified that when they visited the 
Respondent they were allowed to stay up as late as they wanted 
and that they were much harder to control after returning to Salt 
Lake. (tr. 104.) Mr. Bake attributed the deteriorations in beha-
viour to alcohol use in Respondent's household, and lack of 
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supervision, (tr. 103, 104.) Mr. Bake also noted that the boys 
have usually not been fed when he picks them up in the evening 
after visitation. (tr. 105.) 
Mr. Bake indicated that he and his mother would closely 
supervise the children at home and had definite expectations for 
the boy's homework and chores. Mr. Bake testified that one night 
a week the boys were expected to do dishes and were also expected 
to keep their rooms and play area picked up. He also testified 
that he never denied the children clothes or shoes but tried to 
teach them the value of earning money which included that they 
contribute to their purchase of shoes, (tr. 112.) 
In addition to Mr. Bake, the childrens' daily needs were 
also provided for by Cora Bake, the Appellant's mother. Mrs. Bake 
testified that she was employed full time as a school lunch 
manager where she worked from 7:00 to 2:30 every school day but 
was always home before the boys returned from school, (tr. 118, 
119.) 
She testified that Mr. Bake set the rules in the house-
hold and that they would jointly discipline the boys if that was 
needed, by exercising a time-out or having them write down and 
explain what they did wrong and how it should be handled, (tr. 
120, 135.) Mrs. Bake testified that the boys were extremely close 
to Neal stating they were "like shadows with him" and that he 
called at least every other day and often every day to talk to 
the boys when he was on the road (tr. 120, 121.) She testified 
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that these phone calls would not be brief rather that they would 
have long discussions about what the boys were doing and any 
problems that had arisen because communication was important to 
the household. (tr. 120, 121.) Mrs. Bake also testified that 
Neal would stay home from work on occasion if his sons were sick, 
(tr. 122.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial Court failed to make a determination or 
finding of changed circumstances which is an invariable precon-
dition to modification of a Divorce Decree in Utah. Although the 
Decree of Divorce waived such ei determination, the law requires 
this determination before reopening a custody decree and the 
court erred in failing to make such a determination before 
issuing an Order modifying custody herein. 
II. The findings of the trial court to support modifica-
tion of the custody order in this case were insufficient, and 
showed that the Court failed to follow the legal standards 
established in Utah for custody determinations. Further, these 
findings do not set forth a rational basis for changing custody 
from Mr. Bake who had been the sole caretaker of the children for 
over two years. The findings aLso do not reflect that the "best 
interests" of the children were better served by a change of 
custody. 
III. The Court failed to make adequate findings concerning 
the financial circumstances of the parties when making its order 
of child support which was an abuse of discretion. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Introduction 
Neal Bake had sole custody and control of his sons 
Nathan and Kyle for over two years until Judge Dennis Draney 
modified the custody order on grounds that were totally insuf-
ficient and contrary to law. At the outset, Judge Draney did not 
require the moving party to make a showing of any change of cir-
cumstances from the time of the divorce on the custody issue. 
Rather, he waived that burden based on the parties' settlement 
stipulation as reflected in their Decree of Divorce. 
In deciding to change custody, Judge Draney totally 
ignored the substantial part of the Defendant's evidence. That 
is, he makes no reference and apparently gives no weight to the 
fact that Vickey Bake kept in very poor contact with her sons, 
during the two years since the divorce where lapses of two or 
three months would occur with no phone calls, letters or visits 
despite an order permitting weekly visits. Additionally, Judge 
Draney makes no reference, and gives no apparent weight, to the 
dramatic differences in the households and styles of living bet-
ween the parties' homes. He makes no mention of the fact that 
Plaintiff and her husband work full time in a bar which is 100 
feet from where their trailer is and that the children are unsu-
pervised from at least 8:00 at night and often in the mornings. 
This situation contrasts with that of the Defendant where the 
Defendant's parents are present to assist with child rearing and 
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supervision even though the Defendant is often out-of-town during 
the weekdays because of work. 
Lastly, the Court's ruling was made without the benefit 
of a custody evaluation which was previously entered by the 
Court. Prior to the trial, the Appellant filed objections and 
requested a postponement of the trial so this evaluation could be 
done to provide an objective view of the children's best 
interests and this was denied by the Court, (tr. 2, 3, 7, 8.) 
Additionally, the Court imposed severe limitations on the presen-
tation of Appellant's case by ruling that testimony concerning 
Vickey Bake's raising of the minor child in her care, Steven 
Springer, was not relevant. Without a custody evaluation, this 
ruling deprived the court of the best evidence available to show 
the parenting abilities, or lack thereof, of Vickey Bake. 
Appellant submits that although the appealable errors 
are based primarily upon misapplication of the law to the facts, 
the Judge's selective use of the evidence and shallowness of ana-
lysis, poses a disturbing question concerning the courts attitude 
and bias towards Mr. Bake. In short, it appears that the Court 
ruled simply out of a bias in favor of the children being with 
their mother rather than on the basis of the "best interest" of 
the minor children herein. 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE AN INITIAL 
DETERMINATION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO 
MODIFYING CUSTODY. 
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It is well settled in Utah that before a Divorce Decree 
can be modified to change custody, that a showing of substantial 
and material change of circumstances must be made by the moving 
party. In the absence of such a showing the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that a petition to modify custody must be dismissed. 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Ut. 1982); Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 
853 (Ut. 1987). 
The Supreme Court elaborated on the modification 
threshold standard in the case of Becker v. Becker 694 P.2d 608, 
610 (Ut. 1984) where the Court stated: 
"The asserted change must ... have some material rela-
tionship to and substantial effect on the parenting abi-
lity [of the custodial parent] or the functioning of the 
presently existing custodial relationship." 694 P.2d 
610; accord Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 200 (Ut. 
1985). 
If a Court determines that the threshold change of cir-
cumstances has been met on a given issue, then the Court is 
required to weigh all of the evidence in determining whether a 
changed placement would be in the best interest of the child. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10; Williams v. Williams 655 P.2d 652 
(Ut. 1982) Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d at 54. Always an important 
factor in this analysis is the child's interest in maintaining a 
stable long term placement. Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, at 510 
(Ut. 1986). Basically, once the custody question is reopened the 
trial court must consider the changes in circumstance along with 
all other relevant evidence and "determinate de novo which 
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custody arrangement will serve the welfare or best interest of 
the child". Hogge v. Hogge, supra. 
Without question, the Court's equitable powers also give 
it the authority to overrule the stipulation of the parties and 
in this case requires the court to follow legal precedent con-
cerning the burden to show a substantial change of circumstances 
prior to a modification of a custody decree. The trial courts 
failure to apply this essential prerequisite in the present case 
is clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
The trial court herein should have ignored the stipula-
tion waiving the threshold burden of showing changed circumstan-
ces set forth in the decree. There is ample precedent to support 
a trial courts authority to set aside or modify a stipulation of 
the parties as presented in this case. 
In the case of Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Ut. 
1985), the Court expressly addressed the judicial power to modify 
the stipulation for agreement of the parties in the context of 
support awards. Citing Callister v. Callister, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
"It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law was 
intended to give the Courts power to disregard the sti-
pulations or agreement of the parties in the first 
instance and enter judgment for such alimony or child 
support as appears reasonable, and to thereafter modify 
such judgments when a change of circumstances justifies 
it, regardless of attempts of the parties to control the 
matter by contract." 
See also, Nunley v. Nunley, 85 Ut.Adv.Rept. 15 (6/22/88); Clausen 
v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Ut. 1983). 
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Thus, following proper procedure, a Court would not 
reopen a custody question until it had first made a threshold 
finding of substantial and material change of circumstances. 
This did not occur in the case at bar where the Decree of Divorce 
stated that the parties waive the need to show a change of cir-
cumstances and states that if the minor children ever express a 
desire to live with Respondent Vickey Bake then custody would be 
changed. (Exh. A, Decree of Divorce). Based on this decree and 
despite counsel's objections, Judge Draney waived any showing of 
changed circumstances prior to modifying custody herein, (tr. 2, 
3, 167; R. 140-144.) 
Appellant submits that the law in Utah is clearly 
opposed to the parties1 stipulation as stated in the Divorce 
Decree and that it was improper for this Court to not follow 
legal precedent and require a showing of substantial change of 
circumstances prior to modifying the custody decree. Certainly, 
the rationale for the bifurcated modification process in the 
custody area is totally applicable to the case at bar and miti-
gates against the Court's attempt to side step this vital legal 
requirement. The Utah Supreme Court set forth this reasoning in 
the Hogge case as follows: 
"This would protect the custodial parent from harassment 
by repeated litigation and protect the child from "ping 
pong" custody awards....[in] apparent response to the 
importance of stability and custody arrangements, many 
states have adopted a bifurcated procedure for con-
sidering petitions to modify custody awards, (citations 
omitted)." Supra at 54. 
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Clearly, in the present case these children would be at 
risk for a future of "ping pong" custody awards if the Court were 
to consider their wishes as controlling in every instance as the 
parties1 Divorce Decree provides. As argued in closing at trial, 
the childrens1 wishes can only be one of many factors for the 
court to consider before changing custody. Utah Code Annotated 
§30-3-10. More important than the child's preferences is the 
Court's objective assessment of the "best interests" of the 
child, and the past conduct and moral standards of the parties. 
UCA §30-3-10. Relying on a chiLd's preference alone is unsuitable 
for obvious reasons. A child is easily influenced and manipula-
ted; the maturity and insight of minors varies widely; and 
improper considerations may motivate the expressed desire to 
change custody such as wanting a more lenient parent over one who 
applies rules. Of these factors, we have no way of knowing what 
the maturity level of these children are, although we do know 
they are very young at age 11 and 13. We also know that there is 
far less supervision in Respondent's household as proposed to Mr. 
Bake who applies rules and has high expectations of his sons. 
It is noteworthy that the Decree of Divorce in this case 
not only provided for a change of custody based on the preference 
of the children but also gave Vickey Bake extremely liberal visi-
tation consisting of every weekend, the entire summer, cind alter-
nating holidays. Such a generous visitation award could allow a 
caring parent to maintain a close bond to her children with fre-
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quent contact. Sadly, Vickey Bake ignored this opportunity to 
maintain contact with her children. Rather, after she was 
divorced in August, 1985, Vickey Bake had four visits in four 
months with her sons. In all of 1986, out of fifty-two weeks she 
had eight visits and in 1987, January through May there were two 
visits. Additionally, there was unrefuted testimony of frequent 
abuses of visitation which adversely affected the children where 
Vickey Bake made arrangements and would not show up. Also, there 
was an occasion when she refused to return the children on time 
and they missed school. Thus, instead of remaining a strong pre-
sence in her sons lives, Mrs. Bake gave them scant attention 
until Mr. Bake asserted his interest in custody of Steven 
Springer which generated the Respondent's counterclaim for 
custody. 
If nothing else, this erratic and dismal record of 
visitation by a non-custodial parent should have been considered 
by the Court in evaluating whether the stipulation entered by the 
parties in 1985 to change custody based solely on the children's 
preferences alone should be given any weight when the other parts 
of the Decree providing liberal visitation were not adhered to. 
Unfortunately, Judge Draney makes no comment whatsoever on these 
points choosing to ignore Vickey Bake's neglect of her sons by 
failing to visit and the fact that the boys were in fact thriving 
in the care of Mr. Bake and his family. Instead the Court seems 
to apply a bias in favor of mothers having custody instead of 
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weighing the evidence. Such a bias is clearly reversible error, 
as is the Court's failure to require a showing of changed cir-
cumstances. Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Ut. App. 1987). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING 
A MODIFICATION CHANGING CUSTODY TO VICKEY BAKE. 
The trial evidence strongly shows that the Judge should 
have maintained the existing custody award set forth in the 
Divorce Decree rather than modifying that order. Although a trial 
court judge is granted broad discretion in making custody deter-
minations, a Court must apply legal standards to the decision 
making process which rationally relate to the ultimate conclu-
sions in the custody process. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423# 425 
(Ut. 1986). It is particularly because of this broad discretion 
that a trial court judge must carefully weigh all of the evidence 
presented and rule within established legal guidelines to arrive 
at proper conclusions. In the instant case, the trial court 
totally failed in this charge. 
A. Legal Standards in custody modification deter-
minations. 
The threshold issue in a custody modification is whether 
the moving party has shown a substantial change of circumstances 
which justifies reopening the custody issue. (Reference Point I, 
this Brief.) If this burden is met, the court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make changes in custody which are found to be 
"reasonable and necessary." UCA 30-3-5(3). 
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Although a child custody proceeding is equitable in 
nature, nevertheless, a determination of the "best interests of 
the children" is the standard and must be fairly evaluated by the 
Court. Kallas v^ Kallas 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Ut. 1980). 
On numerous occasions this Court has set forth factors 
which should be considered in arriving at conclusions regarding 
the "best interests of children". In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 
649 P.2d 38 (Ut. 1982), this Court listed factors to consider in 
reviewing a child's best interest which focused on the child's 
feelings or needs, and also factors which relate primarily to the 
character or status of the proposed custodians. 
Among the factors focusing on the child's needs were: 
the preference of the child; keeping siblings together; the 
strength of the child's bond with prospective custodians; and, in 
some cases, the general interests in continuing previously deter-
mined custody arrangments where the child is happy and well 
adjusted. Among the factors focusing on the character of the 
custodians, the Court listed: moral character and emotional sta-
bility; duration and depth of desire for custody; ability to pro-
vide personal rather than surrogate care; significant impairment 
of the ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for having 
relinquished custody in the past; religious compatabiliy with the 
child; and, financial condition, (citations omitted) Hutchinson 
at pg. 41. Certainly, the assessment of the applicability and 
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weight of these various facts in a given case is within the 
court's discretion. However, a court may not arbitrcirily substi-
tute factors which are not functionally related to the "best 
interest of the child" standard. Smith v. Smith, supra; 
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra. 
B. Judge Draney Misapplied the Law in Modifying the 
Custody Award to Neal Bake. 
The Findings of Fact entered by Judge Draney show a 
total misapplication of the foregoing law to the facts of this 
case. These findings show no basis whatsoever for terminating the 
custody of Neal Bake which existed uninterrupted for a period of 
over two years prior to the Modification Order. The Supreme Court 
has held that Findings of Fact must demonstrate a rationale and 
logical basis for the ultimate decision on custody by references 
to pertinent factors that relate to the best interest of the 
child, including specific attributes of the parents. Smith v. 
Smith, supra. 
The Findings of Fact in the present case were not logi-
cal, do not relate to the best interest of the children, show 
bias on the part of the trial court, are not supported by the 
evidence in the record and totally ignore critical elements of 
the Defendant/Appellant's evidence. 
1. Findings of Fact 3, 4. (3) "Plaintiff lives in a 
doublewide mobile home with her husband, his daughter Rachel, 
age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew Steven, age 14. The home is located 
in the business district of Roosevelt, Utah, on the same lot, 
somewhat removed from a building containing a cafe and a lounge. 
The home is adequate in size and upkeep for its present occupants 
and for the boys which are the subject of this action." 
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(4) "The Defendant works in Sandy, Utah, with his 
parents in a residential area of the city. The home is adequate 
in size and upkeep for its present occupants including the boys." 
These findings appear to imply that the parties are 
similarly situated and have comparable households. That is defi-
nitely not the case as reflected in the record. The Court makes 
no mention that the bar where respondent works is 100 feet from 
her trailer and that there have been fights both inside and out-
side of the bar which have required police intervention, (tr. 
25.) The size and amenities of the homes are also vastly dif-
ferent where respondents live in a three bedroom trailer with two 
adults and four children (including the children at issue) and 
appellant resides in a five bedroom home with three adults and 
two children where the children have a separate play room, a 
large yard and the school next door. (tr. 89,90.) 
2. Findings of Fact 5, 6. (5) "Plaintiff is employed as 
a waitress at the lounge near her home and works from 8:00 p.m. 
to 1:00 a.m. While she is working, Steven cares for Rachel, and 
there was no evidence that the arrangement had not worked satis-
factorily. Plaintiff would be with the boys virtually every day." 
(6) "Defendant works as a long haul truck driver and is 
away from home the majority of the time. While he is away, his 
mother cares for the boys." 
These very significant findings are a distortion of the 
trial evidence, conclusory, and parts of them are simply 
inaccurate. While the Court notes that Plaintiff would "be with 
the boys virtually every day" there appears to be no mention or 
weight given to the fact that all four children would be unsuper-
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vised after 8:00 p.m. at least five nights a week because both 
Respondent and her husband are working in the bar until 1:00 
a.m.. Concerning the Defendant, the Court notes that he is a long 
haul truck driver and states he is away from home "the majority 
of the time". This is simply not true. Mr. Bake's testimony was 
that he was home most weekends and holidays, (tr. 88) There 
was also testimony that he called his sons on nearly a daily 
basis while he was gone and spent virtually all of his free time 
with them when he was home. (tr. 97, 120, 121.) The Court also 
ignores Mr. Bake's testimony about his efforts to obtain local 
truck driving employment so he could spend more time with his 
children and the fact that he had already changed jobs and 
reduced his income only because the job allowed him to spend more 
time with his sons. (tr. 88.) The Court also ignores totally Mrs. 
Cora Bake's testimony that she cares for the boys on a daily 
basis and is present when they come home from school every day. 
(tr. 118, 119). Importantly, the Court altogether misses the fact 
that Mr. Bake's household provides constant adult supervision for 
the children where Vickey Bake's has no adults present cifter 8:00 
p.m.. There was also significant evidence that the boys benefited 
from the supervision in Mr. Bake's home as they got good grades, 
were healthy, obedient and maintained close family ties. In 
contrast, the lack of supervision by Vickey Bake resulted in the 
deterioration of the children's behavior after visitation. 
3
* Findings of Fact 8. "The boys have expressed a strong 
desire to live with the Plaintiff, stating that they want to be 
with her and with their cousin Steven, and they enjoy school more 
in Roosevelt and that their friends are in Roosevelt." 
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It is clear by statute and case law that in a custody 
decision the preferences of a minor child are not controlling of 
the custody decision and are merely one factor among many for a 
court to consider. Williams v. Williams, supra; U.C.A., 
§30-30-10; see this Brief, Point I infra. Additionally, the Court 
only briefly interviewed the children in chambers and made no 
record of that interview. The Court makes no reference to the 
questions asked of the children, does not assess their credibi-
lity or maturity and thus does not lay a proper foundation for 
expressing these desires as a court "finding" on which a change 
of custody can be based. Most importantly, this shows that this 
court is again being selective and biased in its treatment of the 
evidence. It is noteworthy that there are no findings showing the 
objective success of the children in Mr. Bake's care despite 
substantial evidence at trial. There is unrefuted testimony that 
the children were actively engaged in extracurricular activities, 
scouting, music lessons, that they had friends and activities 
they enjoyed, and that they were succeeding in school and in 
every way appeared to be thriving, (tr. 97, 101-105, 118-122.) 
4. Findings of Fact 9. "A very favorable picture of 
Defendant's home and care for the boys is presented by the testi-
mony of Defendant and his mother. However, the validity of their 
testimony is adversely affected by significant discrepancies in 
the evidence presented by them." 
While acknowledging a "very favorable picture of 
Defendant's home and care for the boys" and in finding No. 8, 
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also acknowledging that Defendant has a deep concern and ability 
to care for the boys needs, the Court nevertheless seems to 
decide that none of the testimony of Mr. Bake or his witnesses 
are to be believed. This testimony is thrown out because of 
"significant discrepancies'1 and yet no such discrepcincies are 
described in the Court's findings and conclusions. 
Additionally, the Court significantly hampered the pre-
sentation of Defendant's case by prohibiting testimony concerning 
the caretaking of Steven Springer by Vickey Bake. (tr. 100.) As 
was argued at trial, this testimony was extremely important as it 
is the best evidence of Vickey Bake's caretaking abilities and 
the Court had no other evidence than Mrs. Bake's own testimony on 
which to assess her parenting abilities. At the outset of the 
trial the Court did not allow a custody evaluation and none had 
been done at the initial divorce, rather, custody was awarded by 
agreement of the parties. 
The Court's failure to specify the "significant discre-
pancies in the evidence" is also very misleading. It is 
impossible to know whether the evidence in which the Court saw 
discrepancies related to the best interest of the children and 
yet these "discrepancies" alone seem to be enough for the Court 
to totally discount the testimony of Mr. Bake and his mother. 
Without further specificity it is impossible to understand this 
finding which is unsupported, vague and sheds no light on the 
court's ruling. 
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5. Findings of Fact 10. "It was the uncontroverted 
testimony of the Plaintiff that the Defendant recently said to 
her "you had better get your boys back". 
In the Defendants post-trial motion to have the court 
reopen judgment and direct entry of a new judgment, and for a 
stay of proceedings to enforce judgment, the Defendant's 
Affidavit was attached and at paragraph 11 thereof, Defendant 
denies that he made the statement to Plaintiff "you had better 
get your boys back". (Motion and Affidavit, is attached hereto, 
Exhibit C.) Rather, in that Affidavit he recalls telling Vickey 
Bake that she should "straighten up her act" if she ever wanted 
to regain custody of the boys. Mr. Bake also explained that he, 
at no time, suggested he did not want to care for the boys, 
rather, that he has repeatedly discussed with Vickey issues con-
cerning her lifestyle and care of the boys which he believes is 
harmful to them. (R. 120-129.) 
Additionally, a review of the trial transcript provides 
more meaning to Mr. Bake's out-of-context statement cited in 
this Finding. The transcript shows Vickey Bake went on to explain 
that Neal also said "you have got to start working on making 
things right like I want them so you can have them back." (tr. 
18.) When Finding 8 is read in context with this follow-up state-
ment, the meaning is clarified to be a statement merely com-
menting on Mrs. Bake's lifestyle, and not a veiled threat 
concerning custody as the Court seems to imply. Frankly, no other 
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interpretation makes sense nor does the court express in its 
conclusions or other findings what interpretation it makes or 
weight is given to Finding 10. Again, this Finding certainly has 
no relevance to the best interests of the children and seems only 
to show the Court's unexplained dissatisfaction with Mr. Bake. 
In short, this unsupported and vague finding of fact 
does not provide a rationale basis on which the Court can make a 
custody modification order. 
In conclusion, the trial court has entirely failed to 
provide a rationale, factual basis for the ultimate decision by 
drafting Findings with references to pertinent facts on the best 
interests of the children. Smith v. Smith, supra at 426. As 
stated in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999, (Ut. 1987), fin-
dings : 
"should be sufficiently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ulti-
mate conclusion on each factual issue was revealed." 
The only factor outlined in Hutchinson, supra, which 
appears in these inadequate findings is that of preferences of 
the children which should not be controlling. Rather, the Court 
ignored valid, unrefuted evidence which was presented concerning 
the Hutchinson factors. To summarize, there was testimony from 
Mrs. Cora Bake, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Bake of the very strong bond 
between Neal Bake and the children. There was testimony con-
cerning Mr. Bake's personal sacrifices to spend time with his 
children and of the close contacts and communication which he 
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maintained with them. There was testimony concerning his sen-
sitivity and responsiveness to the needs of his children such as 
taking them to counseling when it was appropriate and setting up 
structured study times in response to poor grades. There was 
testimony that Mr. Bake's household was structured and well orga-
nized, that the children had appropriate discipline with time-out 
and that they were always under adult supervision. There was also 
testimony concerning adverse factors in Vickey Bake's household 
such as the daily alcohol use by her husband, his history of 
court ordered treatment, the unrefuted testimony of Respondent 
that she was "tired of raising children" as a reason for 
relinquishing custody initially, and the very important objective 
evidence of Respondent's minimal contact with the children during 
the two years since the divorce. The trial court makes absolutely 
no mention of the foregoing testimony and evidence which was pre-
sented to the Court and which represent factors that the Supreme 
Court held to be determinative in custody cases. 
C. The Court Should have Affirmed the Divorce Decree 
Custody Award to Neal Bake and Abused its Discretion 
in modifying that order. 
If the Court had properly reviewed the factors and legal 
standards of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra, the Court should 
have affirmed the original custody award to Neal Bake and made no 
modification thereof. There is simply no evidence on the record 
which points to disturbing the present custody arrangement after 
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the children have been in the care of Mr. Bake for over two 
years, have become well adjusted to the Salt Lake City area, have 
become involved in their school and have gained friends and 
established new successful routines in Appellant's household. 
Despite evidence and argument, the court absolutely ignored these 
factors of stability and continuity in the childs' lives. The 
Court also ignored testimony by Appellant's witnesses of Neal 
Bake's commitment to his family and extended family. There was 
no reference in the Court's opinion nor explanation by Vickey 
Bake of why she had not seen her father Bud Nelson for four 
years. Mr. Nelson testified at trial that he had no ideci why she 
did not keep in touch even though he had made continuing efforts 
to reestablish contact. Instead, it was Mr. Bake that maintained 
the family connection with his grandsons to his ex-wife's parents 
through visits and regular communications. Mr. Nelson testified 
to the closeness he observed between Mr. Bake and his grandsons 
and that the children were well cared for and happy in his care. 
There was also absolutely no mention in the Court's opi-
nion of the unstable and erratic history exhibited by the 
Respondent since the divorce. In the two years since the divorce 
she had moved five times and in two states. She and her husband 
had experienced periods of unemployment and are on food stamps to 
supplement their income. Respondent's witness George Glinds the 
landlord of Respondent and owner of the "Id Lounge" testified 
that he was a receiver appointed by the Bankruptcy Court to 
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operate the lounge. Thus, it is questionable whether that 
employment is stable and certainly, Respondents job history is 
of unskilled labor with her longest employment being Pizza Hut 
where she worked for only two years. 
In contrast to Vickey Bake's own unstable lifestyle 
with frequent changes of residence and employment, Mr. Bake has 
lived ever since his separation with his parents in Sandy. They 
have a large home and are a closely bonded and supportive family 
who have all been active in the caretaking of the children. The 
importance of extended family support and stability such as the 
appellant's was recognized as highly important to the custody 
decision in the case of Hirsch v. Hirsch, 41 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4 
(9-5-86). 
Lastly, the Court totally omitted any reference to 
Vickey Bake's pattern of visitation during the two and a half 
years after the parties' divorce. The highly unusual and objec-
tive evidence of a daily contemporaneous log was presented to the 
Court and was not refuted except by the testimony that there may 
have been a few emergency phone calls which the record keeper 
Mrs. Bake was not aware of. Outside of this, there was no testi-
mony to refute the fact that in the first five months of 1987 
from January through May there were only two actual visits, one 
letter and two phone calls which were not for the purpose to 
arrange visits. There was no testimony to refute that in 1986 
there was only one letter in January, no contact whatsoever 
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in April, or September; only one card in November and in December 
one card and one letter. The Court also failed to mention the 
insensitive and often reckless behaviour of the Respondent which 
could have a definite impact on her parenting abilities., Among 
these examples are when the parties son Kyle was allowed to play 
with a knife and cut himself during visitation. Additionally, 
Kyle suffered from an asthma attack which required hospitaliza-
tion during visitation and when he was returned no mention was 
made of this incident so Mr. Bake had no way of knowing what 
follow-up care or risk may still have existed from this illness. 
Additionally, there was testimony that police intervention was 
required to assist Mr. Bake in retrieving children after visita-
tion and that the children were sometimes not returned in a 
timely fashion which caused them to miss school. Also, there was 
the visitation incident when Vickey Bake arrived an hour early 
and proceeded to simply walk in the house and take the children 
away without informing their caretaker that she was taking the 
children. None of this irresponsible and possibly endangering 
behaviour by Mrs. Bake was referred to in the Court's opinion. 
Finally, the Court restricted testimony concerning Vickey Bakefs 
caretaking of the only related minor child in her care, that is, 
Steven Springer. There was testimony by the social services per-
sonnel of several child neglect referrals concerning Steven 
Springer and yet the Court still barred questioning on this point 
as "irrelevant" to Mrs. Bake's caretaking abilities. 
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Based upon the court's apparent prejudice, failure to 
review appropriate factors, its failure to apply the law, and the 
positive factors which preponderate in favor of Neal Bake's 
having continued custody of the minor children Nathan and Kyle, 
it is apparent that the Court abused its discretion. As this 
Court has traditionally held and recently stated: 
"This Court will not overturn a trial court's custody 
determination on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
shows that the determination was not in the best 
interest of the child or that the trial Court misapplied 
a applicable principles of law1'. Smith v. Smith, at 425. 
This case is one of those clear instances when the Court 
abused it's discretion and should be reversed. 
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING CHILD 
SUPPORT TO VICKEY BAKE 
The Decree of Divorce stated that "based on the par-
ties' income and their agreement, Plaintiff should have no obli-
gation to pay child support. Alimony was also waived by the 
parties. (Ex. A, Findings of Fact, para. 7). At trial, the 
financial declaration statements were submitted by both parties, 
and the Court found that Vickey Bake earned $1,217.00 per month 
and the Defendant earned $1,109.24 per month. Based on these fin-
dings the Court entered a support order that Mr. Bake should pay 
the sum of $115.00 per month, per child to Mrs. Bake. 
Appellant submits that these conclusory findings by the 
court assessing child support against Mr. Bake are totally inade-
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quate and are reversible error. The Utah Supreme Court has 
clearly held that the trial court must make findings on all 
material issues. Acton v. Deliran, supra. The findings made by 
Judge Draney on child support do not specifically set forth the 
financial condition or need for support, including earning capa-
city or ability to pay for either party. Such a failure to 
address the basic factors necessary to make a proper support 
award requires reversal of that award. Rather, the Court should 
have considered all of the factors set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-45-7 which states: 
"The Court, in determining the amount of prospective 
support, shall consider all relevant factors including 
but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living in situation of the par-
ties 7 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) at the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
All of the above factors constitute material issues 
upon which the trial court must enter Findings of Fact. Jefferies 
v. Jefferies, 80 Ut.Adv.Rept. 18 (4-13-88). Additionally, in the 
present case the Court gave great deference on other issues to 
the parties1 stipulation as incorporated in their Decree of 
Divorce. That stipulation waives support and alimony and should 
have been a consideration in awarding support herein. Certainly, 
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the fact that Vickey Bake, the recipient of the support earns 
more than Neal Bake would have been an important factor to con-
sider in assessing this support award. The Court makes no mention 
of this fact and nor does the Court disclose the basis for its 
$115.00 per month assessment which is higher than the Uniform 
Child Support Schedule used by the Utah Office of Recovery 
Services. 
For these reasons the Court's award of child support is 
vague, based on insufficient findings, and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
On the issue of custody modification the Court erred at 
the outset of trial by proceeding without the requested custody 
evaluation and by failing to have respondent carry her burden of 
proof to establish a substantial, material change of circumstan-
ces before reopening the custody issue. The Findings of Fact con-
cerning the custody award are clearly not dispositive of the best 
interest of the children, constitute a misapplication of the law 
to the facts, wholly failed to consider prominent basis that this 
Court has asserted should be controlling in custody matters, and 
discloses an apparent bias by the trial court against Mr. Bake's 
continuing custody. The Court also fails to make sufficient fin-
dings or follow applicable legal standards in setting the child 
support herein. This Court should reverse the judgment of the 
trial court as abuses of discretion and enter judgment in 
accordance with the controlling cases set forth herein, and the 
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facts and the record which Appellant submits require affirming 
the original custody award of the minor children to Neal Bake. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2f day of July, 1988. 
JZANNE/MARELIUS / 
ttora^y for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing "Appellant's Brief" to Attorney for the 
Respondent, Mr. Clark Allred, NIELSEN & SENIOR, 36 South State, 
Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid this 2:? 
day of July, 1988. 
28491(501) 
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STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care 
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include 
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the pay-
ment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court 
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and 
health and dental care, or the distribution of the'property as shall be rea-
sonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and 
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child. 
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automati-
cally terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that 
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony 
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party 
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined. 
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the 
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is 
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship 
or association between them is without any sexual contact. 
30-3-10. Custody of children. In any case of separation of husband 
and wife having minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void 
or dissolved the court shall make such order for the future care and cus-
tody of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody; however, such expressed desires shall 
not be controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support.—(1) Prospective sup-
port shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order unless 
there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of the 
obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in 
circumstances has occurred, the court in determining the amount of 
prospective support, shall consider all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and 
assess all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) The amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; 
(b) The funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in 
support of spouse and children. 
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ADDENDUMS AND EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT A 
GAYLE F. MCKEACHNTE 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal , Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIA*. DISTRICT CO'/RT OV '^ .VrlKUNL COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKEY L. BAKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
NEAL F. BAKE, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made 
in chis matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce dissolving the 
bonds or matrimony now existing between the parties, the sanv- to 
become final on signing and entry, 
2. Defendant is awarded the care, custody, and control of 
the minor children subject to the right of Plaintiff to visit the 
children at reasonable times and places including havina the boys 
on weeKends, the summer vacation and every other holiday. The 
alternating holidays shall be Christmas, Thanksgiving, New 
Year's, July 4th, July 24th, Labor Day and Memorial Day. When 
the boys are with the Plaintiff in the summer, the Defendant 
shall have visitation rights on every weekend. All important 
DIVORCE DECPEF 
^ 
J r- s 
Civil No. 
decisions reqarding the hoys, surh as medical and schooling, 
shall be discussed between the parties. Since the award of 
custody is based 0*1 the desire of the children in the event the 
boys change their mind and express a desire to return to live 
with their mother custody will be changed awarding custody to the 
Plaintiff without a need to show a change of circumstances. In 
the event custody is changed to the Plaintiff, then Defendant 
will be entitled to the visitation riqhts outlined herein for the 
Plaintiff. 
3. Defendant is hereby ordered and obligated to pay all ol 
the debts and obligations incurred by the parties or either of 
them prior to the filing of this action and the Defendant shall 
provide medical and dental insurance for the children. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded the mobile home and premises 
located at Roosevelt, Utah suoject to any liens thereon, the six 
and one-third acres located in Neoia, Utah, the 1979 &*&—19 0-5-
Ford pickup trucks, the 1970 Javelin automobile, -£-ke—ten—foot 
•camping—b-Esailer and her personal property. 
5. Defendant is awarded all his personal property 
presently in his possession, -< -"'>«. ^ U< <-••*, ->^ .* A ~ <-€,.ceS S*> 6 * <r£s * 
6. Defendant is ordered to reimburse Plaintiff the sum of 
$250.00 for part of the legal fees and costs she has incurred 
herein. 
DATED this day of July, 1985. 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: v^ Richard C. Davidson 
GAY LB F . McKi.ACHNIE 
CLARK B. All,RED 
NIELSEN *> SENIOR 
A 1 1 o r r. rj y> f v> c Pl^« i nt** i ff 
36 3 East Main Street 
Vernal, t;tah 34078 
Tcijphone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
V'ICKEY L. BAKE, ) 
) FINDINGS 01 FACT 
Plaintiff, ) AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
NFAL F. BAKE, ) 
Defendant. ) Civil No. 
This matter was heard before me, Judge of the above entitled 
Court, ;>n the day of , 1935. 
Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by Clark 3. 
Allred, attorney. Defendant was not present in Court. 
Defendant and Plaintiff have entered into the written 
stipulation and property settlement agreement and Defendant has 
waived the JQ day period between the filing of the Complaint and 
the hearing for the decree of divorce. 
The Court found that good cause existed for waiving the 
remainder of the 90 day waiting period between the filing of the 
Complaint and the hearing for the decree of divorce and the Court 
heard the testimony of the Plaintiff and approved a written 
stipulation and property settlement agreement and after being 
fuLly advised, makes these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a re.; id^nt )f Due1. • -.•,. :e County, State of 
Utah, and has been for rrore than three months immediate ly prior 
to the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husbari'i _ii: ri wifv, having 
married on August 1, 1972. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant are the parents of the 
fullowing minor children as issue of tnis marriage, to-wit: 
Nathen Frank October 10, 1974 
Kyle Kirk December 17, 1976 
4. Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded the 
care, custody and control of the minor children and the children 
have expressed a desire to live with tne Defendant. The parties 
have agreed that since the award oi custody j^ s_jD^ a^ ed on the 
desires of the children that in the event the boys ch^nqe their 
mind and express a desire to return to live with their mother 
that custody will be changed awarding custody to the Plaintiff 
without a need to show a change of circumstances. 
5. Plaintiff should have reasonable visitation rights with 
the minor children including having the boys on weekends, the 
summer and every other holiday. The alternating holidays being 
Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year's July 4th, July 24th, Labor 
Day and Memorial Day. When the boys are with the Plaintiff in 
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the summer, the Defendant should have visitation rights on every 
weekend. In the nvent the custody ui the children is changed, 
the Defendant should be entitled to the visitation rights 
outlined herein for the Plaintiff. 
6. Defendant has treated Plaintin cruelly, causing her 
great mental distress and suffering. 
7. Based on the parties income and their agreement 
Plaintiff should have no dufey to pay child support. Both parties 
have waived any claim to alimony. 
y^ Defendant should be obligated to pay all of the debtF 
and obligations incurred by the parties or either of them during 
the marriage and the Defendant should provide medical and dental 
insurance for the children. 
yf 9. The parties have certain property which should be 
t*j ?/•? // : - '< « ^ sJ*
 t -^  
divided as follows: ' 
a. The mobile home and premises located at Roosevelt, Utah 
subject to any liens thereon, the six ana one-third acres located 
in Neola, Utah,^ the 1979 -«*a—i-9GS- Ford pickup trucks', the 1970 
Javelin automobile, - the ten foot eampinc -trailer and her personal 
property should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
b. All his personal property presently in his possession 
should be awarded to Defendant. /i< LS,^ 7L* >+'-<«*i <v* * /*J/ **.-<>,*/<. &y ?£s 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes: 
1* Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a divorce from 
3 
Defendant, the decree to become final o\\ its signing and entry. 
2. Defendant is entitled to be awarded the care, ^pstody 
and control of the minor or children subject to the right of 
Plaintiff to visit the minor children at reasonable times in*! 
places including having the boys on weekends, the summer school 
vacation and every other holiday. The alternating holidays being 
Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year's, July 4th, July 24th, Labor 
Day and Memorial Day. When the boys are with the Plaintiff in 
the summer, the Defendant shall have visitation rights on every 
weekend. All important decisions regarding the boys, such is 
medical and schooling, shall be discussed between the parties. 
Since this award of custody is based on the desire of the 
children in the event the boys change their mind and express a 
desire to return to live with their mother that custody will be 
changed awarding custody to the Plaintiff without a need to show 
a change of circumstances. In the event custody is changed to 
the Plaintiff, then the Defendant will be entitled to the 
visitation outlined herein for the Plaintiff. 
3. Alimony by both parties is waived. 
4. Defendant should be obligated to pay all of the debts 
and obligations incurred by the parties or either of them during 
the marriage and the Defendant should provide medical and dental 
insurance for the children. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded the mobile home and 
premises located at Roosevelt, Utah subject to any liens thereon, 
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the six and one-third acres located in Neola, Utah,, the 1979 *f.(l. 
-1965 Ford pickup truckp', the 1970 Javtlin automobile, -JrU^ -fcc r, 
—4o«rt—crcTmpifKj tra-ileir and her personal property. The Defendant 
should be awarded all his personal property presently in his 
possession. "-^ * -r <-«<- .00. *r-j . 
6. Defendant should pay to Plaintiff $250.00 as 
reimbursement for part of her legal fees. 
DATED this day of July, 1985. 
District Judge 
Richard C. Davidson 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
.vr...>. / - •,. ... • ; 
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CLARK B. ALLRED 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE 
NIELSEN U SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-490? 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CCL'Kl OF DUCHHSN!! COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKEY L. BAKE, ) 
) STIPULATION AND 
Plaintiff, ) PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
) AGREEMENT 
vs. ) 
NEAI. F. BAKE, ) 
Defendant. ) Civil No. 35-CV-137D 
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff has filed a complaint for divorce and 
whereas the parties have agreed regarding the division of their 
property, the payment or support and the custody of their 
children, and; 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to set forth their agreement in 
writing and requests that the court enter a decree of divorce 
according to the terms of this stipulation and property 
settlement agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
1. The parties both request that the court waive any 
further waiting period, that a decree of divorce be awarded to 
Plaintiff and that the same become final on signing and entry. 
2. The parties have two children, Nathan Frank and Kyle 
Kirk. The two children have expressed a preference of residing 
with the Defendant. Therefore, it is agreed that custody bo 
awarded to the Defendant and that Plaintiff have reasonable 
visitation rights including have the boys on weekends, the summer 
vacation and every other holiday. The alternating holidays 
should be Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year's, July 4th, July 
24th, Labor Day and Memorial Day. When the boys are with thp 
Plaintiff in the summer, the Defendant shall have visitation 
rights on every weekend. The parties further agree that all 
important decisions regarding the boys, such as medical and 
schooling shall be discussed between the parties. The parties 
further agree that since this agreement on custody is based on 
the desires of the children that in the event the boys change 
their mind and express a desire to return to live with their 
mother that custody will be changed awarding custody to the 
Plaintiff without a need to show a change of circumstances. In 
the event custody is changed to the Plaintiff, then the Defendant 
will be entitled to the visitation rights outlined herein for the 
Plaintiff. OP 
2. It is agreed that Plaintiff shall have no ^ 4fey to pay 
child support. Both parties hereby waive any claim to alimony. 
3. It is agreed that Defendant shall pay all medical 
obligations and other bills incurred prior to the filing of this 
action and that the Defendant will provide medical and dental 
insurance for the children. 
2 
4. It is agreed that Plaintiff should be awarded the mobile 
home and premises located at Roosevelt, L'tah subject to any liens .0 
thereon, the six and one-third acres located in Neola, Utah,
 7 the 
1979 <a£^ a—l!)b5- Ford pickup-truck/, the 1970 Javelin automobile, 
-£he— ten foot eamping -trailer and hor personal property and that 
Defendant should be awarded all his personal property presently 
in his possession^ <W~<<>^ •/,.,- .-/v.,/ ** * /;*•' <«..,."«' ~* '-y *•'-•' f •*•'' ."° J> 
5. It is agreed that Defendant will reimburse Plaintiff the 
sum of $250.00 for part of the legal fees and costs she has 
incurred herein 
DATED this of July, 1985., 
\ftrdkey L." BAKfe^ 
y 
I < -
v / 
Neal F . Bake 
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EXHIBIT B 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN 6 SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKEY L. BAKE now known as 
VICKEY L. ADDERLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEAL F. BAKE, 
Defendant. 
i RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
1 ORDER 
i Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
The above captioned matter came before the Domestic 
Commissioner on May 18, 1987, pursuant to the Petitions filed by 
both parties. Plaintiff was present and represented by her 
attorney, Clark B. Allred. Defendant was present and represented 
by his attorney, Suzanne Marelius. The Court having reviewed the 
Petitions, the financial statements filed by the parties and 
having discussed the matter with the parties makes the following 
recommendations. 
1. Defendant's Petition regarding Steven Springer should 
be dismissed without prejudice. The question of custody of 
Steven Springer should either be handled through the Juvenile 
Court or in the alternative a Petition for Guardianship should be 
filed in the Probate Division of District Court. Because of the 
uncertain status of the Juvenile Court proceeding involving 
Steven Springer, the Commissioner recommends that presently 
physical custody remain with the Plaintiff and Defendant have 
reasonable visitation rights with Steven which should include 
every other weekend, one day during the week when Defendant does 
not have weekend visitation and six weeks in the summer, being 
either a continuous six weeks or two three week periods depending 
on Steven's schedule. 
2. Unless Defendant can provide proof that Plaintiff has 
the tools requested in his Counter-Petition or can show that 
Plaintiff has had possession of said tools and disposed of the 
same his Counter-Petition should be dismissed. 
3. The Plaintiff's Petition reguesting a change of custody 
of the two minor children, Nathan and Kyle, requires a 
determination by the Court as to what is the best interest of the 
children. The Decree has waived the need for a change of 
circumstances. In order for the Court to determine what is in 
the best interest of the children it is recommended that a 
custody evaluation be performed and the Commissioner further 
recommends that only one evaluator be retained by both parties 
and that both parties share the costs. 
Defendant has 10 days in which to make specific objections 
2 
to the Recommendations and Order. 
DATED this day of May, 1987. 
Howard Maetani 
Domestic Commissioner 
The above recommendations are hereby adopted by the Court 
and incorporated as the Court's Recommendations and Order. 
DATED this day of May# 1987. 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Suzanne Marelius 
Attorney for Defendant 
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EXHIBIT C 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKEY L. BAKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEAL F. BAKE, 
Defendant . 
R U L I N G 
Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
This matter came on for hearing on January 19, 1988 and was 
re-convened on January 21, 1988. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by Clark B. Allred, and Defendant was present and 
represented by Suzanne Marelius. Each of the parties and other 
witnesses were called, and testified regarding the fitness of the 
parties for custody, and the adequacy of the homes occupied by 
the parties. Upon stipulation of the parties and counsel, the 
court interviewed each of the boys separately, in private, in 
chambers. Based upon the testimony given, the evidence received, 
and the statements of the children, the court finds: 
1. The Plaintiff lives in a double-wide mobile home with her 
husband, his daughter Rachel, age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew Steven, 
age 14. The home is located in the business district of Roosevelt, 
Utah, on the same lot, somewhat removed from a building containing 
a cafe and a lounge. The home is adequate in size and upkeep for 
its present occupants and for the boys which are the subject of 
this action. 
2. The Defendant lives in Sandy, Utah with his parents in 
a residential area of the city. The home is adequate in size and 
upkeep for its present occupants including the boys. 
3. Plaintiff is employed as a waitress at the lounge near 
her home, and works from 8:00 P.M. to 1:00 A.M. While she is 
working, Steven cares for Rachel, and there was no evidence that 
the arrangement has not worked satisfactorily. Plaintiff would 
be with the boys virtually every day. 
4. Defendant works as a long-haul truck driver, and is away 
from home the majority of the time. While he is away, his mother 
cares for the boys. 
5. Both of the parties have a deep concern for the boys, and 
have the ability to care for their needs. 
6. The boys have expressed a strong desire to live with the 
Plaintiff, stating that they want to be with her and with their 
cousin Steven, and they enjoy school more in Roosevelt, and that 
their friends are in Roosevelt. 
7. A very favorable picture of Defendant's home and care for 
the boys is presented by the testimony of the Defendant and his 
mcther. However, the validity of their testimony is adversely 
affected by significant discrepancies in the evidence presented by 
them. 
8. It was the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff that 
the Defendant recently said to her "You'd better get your boys 
back." 
9. Plaintiff earms #1,217.00 per month, and supports her 
nephew, Steven. Defendant earns $1,109.24 per month. 
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Based on the foregoing findings, the court concludes that the 
best interests of the boys are served by awarding their custody 
to the Plaintiff, subject to the reasonable visitation rights of 
the Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff's petition is granted, and 
the Decree of Divorce is modified to award the care, custody and 
control of Nathan Bake and Kyle Bake to the Plaintiff, now Vickey 
L. Adderly. Defendant is awarded visitation rights as previously 
awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant is ordered to pay child support 
to the Plaintiff in the sum of $115.00 per month per child, and 
is ordered to maintain health and accident insurance on the children. 
Each party is to pay one-half {%) the cost of medical expenses not 
covered by insurance. If Defendant does not maintain such 
insurance, he shall be responsible for all medical expense which 
would have been covered by insurance. The parties are ordered not 
to do or say anything which will alienate the children from the 
other parent, or from other close family members. 
DATED this £jptfc day of January, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Clark B. Allred 
Suzanne Marelius 
AJ^^^ G^-* 
EXHIBIT D 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKEY L. BAKE now known 
as VICKEY L. ADDERLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEAL F. BAKE, 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on January 19, 1988. The trial was reconvened on January 21, 
1988. Plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, 
Clark B. Allred. Defendant was present and represented by 
Suzanne Marelius. The matter was before the Court, pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Petition to Change Custody of the parties two minor 
children. Each of the parties and other witnesses were called 
and testified regarding the issues before the Court. The parties 
and their counsel stipulated that the Court should interview each 
of the two boys separately, in private, in chambers. Based upon 
the testimony and other evidence received and upon the statements 
of the boys, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced on August 19, 1985. 
2. The parties are the parents of two children, Nathan 
Frank Bake born October 10, 1974 and Kyle Kirk Bake born December 
17, 1976. 
3. The Plaintiff lives in a double-wide mobile home with 
her husband, his daughter Rachel, age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew 
Steven, age 14. The home is located in the business district of 
Roosevelt, Utah, on the same lot, somewhat removed from a 
building containing a cafe and a lounge. The home is adequate in 
size and upkeep for its present occupants and for the boys which 
are the subject of this action. 
4. The Defendant lives in Sandy, Utah with his parents in 
a residential area of the city. The home is adequate in size and 
upkeep for its present occupants including the boys. 
5. Plaintiff is employed as a waitress at the lounge near 
her home, and works from 8:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. While she is 
working, Steven cares for Rachel, and there was no evidence that 
the arrangement has not worked satisfactorily. Plaintiff would 
be with the boys virtually every day. 
6. Defendant works as a long-haul truck driver, and is 
away from home the majority of the time. While he is away, his 
mother cares for the boys. 
7. Both of the parties have a deep concern for the boys, 
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and have the ability to care for their needs. 
8. The boys have expressed a strong desire to live with 
the Plaintiff, stating that they want to be with her and with 
their cousin Steven, and they enjoy school more in Roosevelt, and 
that their friends are in Roosevelt. 
9. A very favorable picture of Defendant's home and care 
for the boys is presented by the testimony of the Defendant and 
his mother. However, the validity of their testimony is 
adversely affected by significant discrepancies in the evidence 
presented by them. 
10. It was the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff 
that the Defendant recently said to her "You'd better get your 
boys back." 
11. Plaintiff earns $1,217.00 per month, and supports her 
nephew, Steven. Defendant earns $1,109.24 per month. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters 
the following Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties two boys have expressed a desire to return 
to live in the custody of their mother. 
2. It is in the best interest of the parties two boys that 
their custody be changed to the Plaintiff, subject to the 
Defendant having reasonable visitation rights. 
3. Plaintiff's Petition should be granted and the Decree 
3 
of Divorce modified to award the care, custody and control of the 
two minor boys to the Plaintiff. 
4. Defendant should be awarded to pay child support to 
Plaintiff the sum of $115.00 per month per child. 
5. Defendant has health and accident insurance available 
on the children and he should be ordered to maintain that 
insurance on the children. The parties should split the costs of 
any expenses not covered by insurance and if Defendant fails to 
provide insurance he should be responsible for those medical 
expenses. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
Shelly Massey, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorney for Plaintiff, herein; that she served 
the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW upon counsel 
by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Ms. Suzanne Marelius 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
day of February, 1988. 
Subscribed and sworn to before- me this & day of 
February, 1988. f) A / — * N 
My commission expires: Notary Public 
/^ II ^\ )//5>JP Residing at Vernal, Utah 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKEY L. BAKE now known ] 
as VICKEY L. ADDERLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEAL F. BAKE, 
Defendant. ] 
i ORDER AND DECREE MODIFYING 
i DIVORCE DECREE 
I Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court for 
trial on January 19, 1988, and the Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised, 
hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. The parties Divorce Decree is hereby modified and the 
care, custody and control of the parties two minor boys, Nathan 
Bake and Kyle Bake is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, Vickey L. 
Adderly. 
2. Defendant, Neal Bake, is hereby awarded visitation 
rights with the children. The visitation rights are to be the 
same as the visitation rights that were originally awarded to the 
Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the parties Divorce Decree. 
3. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum 
of $115.00 per month per child as child support beginning 
February, 1988. 
4. Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance on the children. Each party is to pay one-
half of any medical expense not covered by insurance. If 
Defendant fails to maintain health and accident insurance on the 
children then he will be responsible for all medical expenses 
which would have been covered by that insurance. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-2 Defendant 
is authorized to institute the income withholding provisions of 
Section 78-453-1 et. seq. Whenever child support is delinquent 
as defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-l(4) appropriate 
income withholding procedures shall apply to all existing and 
further payors. This provision shall remain in effect until the 
Defendant no longer owes child support. 
6. It is further ordered that neither party shall do or 
say anything which will alienate the children from the other 
party or from other close family members. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
Dennis L. Draney "~ 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
Shelly Massey, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorney for Plaintiff, herein; that she served 
the attached ORDER AND DECREE MODIFYING DIVORCE DECREE upon 
counsel by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Ms. Suzanne Marelius 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah, on the i j5 
day of February, 1988. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this S day of 
February, 1988. ~ ^ 
My commission expires: Notary Public 
/7 A ^ ~
 ljr ^ 0 Residing at Vernal, Utah prS/- £P fid* 
EXHIBIT E 
SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEPIELD fc PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
VICKEY L. BAKE now known 
VICKEY L. ADDERLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NEAL F. BAKE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO HAVE COURT REOPEN 
JUDGMENT AND DIRECT ENTRY OF A 
NEW JUDGMENT, AND FOR A STAY 
OF PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
(Judge Dennis Draney) 
ooOoo 
Defendant Neal F. Bake by and through counsel moves this 
Court pursuant to Rules 59 and 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for an Order to Reopen the Judgment in this matter for 
the purpose of taking additional testimony relating to the issue 
of custody of the minor child of the parties, and to direct entry 
of a new judgment. Plaintiff further moves this Court to stay 
proceedings to enforce the Judgment altering custody in this 
action. 
Defendant requests that this Court reopen the Judgment 
for the purpose of obtaining a custody evaluation as recommended 
by Domestic Relations Commissioner Howard Maetani to be conducted 
to determine the best interests of the minor children regarding a 
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change of custody and to evaluate the fitness and appropriateness 
of the parties requesting custody. Such an evaluation was not 
obtained by the parties because of their financial limitations 
and the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Direct the Division of 
Family Services to conduct such an evaluation. 
Furthermore, Defendant respectfully submits that the 
decision of the Court in this matter was not supported by the 
evidence and was contrary to law. The Court made no finding of 
changed circumstances which is a precondition to modifying a 
Divorce Decree. It is well settled that before a Divorce Decree 
can be modified to change custody, a showing of "substantial 
material" change of circumstances must be made. In the absence of 
such a showing the Utah Supreme Court has held a petition to 
modify custody must be dismissed. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51 
(Utah 1982), and Lord v^ Shaw 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, the Court erred in not setting forth par-
ticularized findings as to why it would be in the best interests 
of the minor children herein to change custody from Defendant's 
care to the Plaintiff where they have resided with the Defendant 
for over two years since the Divorce and are bonded to him very 
strongly. The requirement for a Court to specify the best 
interest of the child in the Findings and Conclusions of Law as 
set forth in the following case. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 
38 (Utah 1982) and most recently Smith v. Smith, 43 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 
5 (No. 20419, filed 9-30-86). 
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Additionally, Defendant has moved this Court to stay the 
Judgment transferring custody of the minor children from 
Defendant's care to Plaintiff. In suppport of this second request 
for a stayf Defendant submits that the Court has erred in not 
directing the Division of Family Services to conduct an eva-
luation; by not requiring Plaintiff to show a change of cir-
cumstances before modifying a Decree of Divorce; and by not 
finding that it would be in the best interest of the minor 
children to have custody changed. Unless a stay of the judgment 
transferring custody is granted, the children may suffer irre-
parable injury in the event this Court's ruling is overturned on 
appeal and custody is returned to the Defendant. The minor 
children have resided with the Defendant since August of 1985, 
and have a stable, secure home with the Defendant to whom they 
are closely bonded, and it would be very disruptive to them to 
change schools and be uprooted from their neighborhood and 
friends at this time. Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice from a 
stay of the Court's ruling as she has exercised visitation with 
the minor children since the divorce. 
Defendant specifically requests the Court to alter it's 
Judgment as regards Paragraph Number 8 of the Ruling where the 
Court states Defendant said to Plaintiff "you better get your 
boys back". Defendant's Affidavit is attached hereto which speci-
fically denies making this statement or that it was not taken in 
the appropriate context. 
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These Motions are based upon the pleadings on file, the 
testimony introduced at trial and the Affidavit of Defendant sub-
mitted herewith. 
DATED this j[_ day of February, 1988. 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Attorney for the Plaintiff, Mr. Clark B. 
Allred, NIELSEN 6 SENIOR, 363 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah, 
84078, postage prepaid this ^ day of February, 1988. 
25471 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD 6 PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
VICKEY L. BAKE now known ) 
VICKEY L. ADDERLEY, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF NEAL F. BAKE 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
NEAL F. BAKE, ) 
) Civil No. 85-CV-137D 
Defendant. ) (Judge Dennis Draney) 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW Neal F. Bake who upon his oath deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Defendant in the above-captioned matter and 
was given custody of my sons when I was divorced from Plaintiff 
in August of 1985. 
2. Plaintiff's petition to modify the Decree of Divorce 
and obtain custody was tried on January 19 and 21 , 1988. At that 
time the Court ruled that the Plaintiff should have custody of 
our sons Nathan H. Bake, age 13 and Kyle Bake, age 11. 
3. My sons have lived with me ever since the divorce in 
August 1985, and the Plaintiff has had visitation. The divorce 
was settled by a Stipulation between myself and the Plaintiff 
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where she agreed that I should have custody. That Decree also 
states that if the children change their mind and express a 
desire to live with the Plaintiff then custody will change. 
4. Although I am aware that the children have expressed 
a desire at times, to live with the Plaintiff, I do not believe 
this is in their best interest and believe that a change of 
custody would be extremely detrimental to them. I believe that 
the main reason they have expressed a desire to live with the 
Plaintiff is because they have very little supervision when they 
are in her home and they do not have the maturity to make a 
reasoned decision on this matter. 
5. The Plaintiff lives in a trailer in Roosevelt, Utah, 
located behind the "Wave Lounge" (formerly "ID Club"). 
Plaintiff's employment is as a waitress in the lounge. The 
Plaintiff works from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m., as does her hus-
band who works from 4:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. in the bar. Thus, 
the children are without any supervision after 8:00 p.m. every 
night. 
6. Since the Divorce two years ago the Plaintiff has 
moved at least four times and since the Divorce she has worked 
for Pizza Hut and at her present waitressing job. The Wave Lounge 
where Plaintiff works is in bankruptcy or foreclosure and it is 
thus likely that the employment of both Plaintiff and her husband 
there may soon end. It is thus reasonable to anticipate that the 
Plaintiff may again have to move or go out of state as she has 
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done before, and that I will have very little access to my sons 
if Plaintiff were to have custody. They will also have less sta-
bility than if they lived with me. 
7. I also question the commitment which Plaintiff has to 
our sons as her visitation has been sporadic and there have been 
gaps of several months with no contact, not even a phone call 
or letter, although Plaintiff is entitled to visitation every 
weekend. A complete log has been kept of the Plaintiff"s con-
tact with our sons ever since the divorce which shows the 
following: 
1987 
1987 
1986 
1986 
January through May 
April 
January through June 
April 
July through December 
1985 
September and November 
December 
September through 
December 
there were two visits, three 
phone calls and one letter 
during this time* 
No contact. 
A total of five visits occurred 
one in February, one in March, 
one in May and two in June. 
No contact. 
A total of three visits 
occurred, two of which involved 
me taking the boys to visit the 
Plaintiff. 
No calls or visits. 
A card was received. 
A total of four visits plus 
Thanksgiving was spent with 
the Plaintiff. 
8. During the two years I have had custody I have fre-
quently facilitated visitation between the boys and the Plaintiff 
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by driving them to Roosevelt, Utah, from my home in Sandy. I have 
always resided at the same location and Plaintiff has always had 
my address and phone number. There have also been several 
occasions where visitation has been scheduled and either can-
celled by the Plaintiff or forgotten by her. 
9. In addition, I am extremely concerned about the care 
Kyle and Nathan have received while with the Plaintiff. The 
following are some examples of her poor care of the boys while in 
her custody. 
December 29, 1985: The boys were returned to my home at 
10:00 a.m., without having had breakfast; 
June 27, 1986: I picked up the boys from Plaintiff at 
7:00 p.m. and they had not been fed dinner; in fact, they are 
usually never fed when I picked them up at 7:00 p.m. 
August 1987: During visitation my youngest son was 
allowed to play with a knife and cut himself and was required to 
have stitches. 
My son Kyle has asthma which normally does not affect 
him unless under emotional strees. The only episodes of asthma 
attacks he has had since the divorce have been while in 
Plaintiff's care. Most recently, this occurred while Kyle was 
with Plaintiff on December 30 and he was hospitalized. 
Additionally, the Plaintiff did not, inform me of this hospitali-
zation and I fear she will continue to hide information con-
cerning my son's welfare if she has custody. 
10. My nephew Steven, who is in Plaintiff's full time 
care has not had his needs adequately met. For example, he is 
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underweight in my opinion and there have been several referrals 
by the Division of Family Services regarding his neglect. Steven 
also has very bad teeth and Plaintiff has not given him adequate 
dental care. I am obviously extremely concerned about the quality 
of care that Nathan and Kyle would receive from the Plaintiff if 
custody were changed. Also, when mye boys have returned from 
visitation their behaviour is very different then when they are 
living with me, as they are more disobedient and unruly. I 
believe this is because they have little supervision when they 
are with Plaintiff, and no supervision after 8:00 p.m. at night 
and I know they are allowed to stay up as long as they wish. 
11. The Court's ruling, at paragraph 8, quotes a state-
ment which I do not believe I made, reporting that I said to the 
Plaintiff "you had better get your boys back". I have no 
recollection of making this statement and do not believe I did. 
Rather, I do recall telling Plaintiff that she should "straighten 
up her act" if she ever wanted to regain custody of the boys. At 
no time did I suggest to her that I did not want to be the care-
taker for the boys, rather, I have discussed with her the 
problems concerning her lifestyle and care of the boys which I 
believe is harmful to them. 
12. I have a very strong sense of family ties and have 
made the effort to keep the children in touch through visits and 
calls with the Plaintiff's parents. The Plaintiff, has not main-
tained ties with her parents or extended family. The Plaintiff 
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has also denied me visitation and telephone contact with my 
nephew Steven who is in Plaintiff's exclusive care. I had to 
obtain a Court Order to get rights to visit and call Steven. I 
fear that if Plaintiff were to have custody of Nathan and Kyle 
that Plaintiff would again deny me access to my sons and also 
deny the access of my family with whom she does not like, and may 
even move out of state as she has done in the past. I believe it 
would be quite detrimental to my sons to have their family rela-
tionships undermined in this way. 
DATED this *zT day of February, 1988. 
&*< 
NEAL\F. BAKE 
Defendant 
J^^cS^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s g P ^ a y of 
F e b r u a r y , 1988 . 
U^-NOTARY PUBLIC C s~ , ,
 / 
Residing a t : / k f f i ^ k / U , /AA^frS^ 
My Commission Expires: ^ 
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